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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena:
RACIAL
CLASSIFICATIONS
DEVELOPED TO
FURTHER A
COMPELLING
GOVERNMENTAL
INTEREST MUST
BE ABLE TO
WITHSTAND
"STRICT SCRUTINY. "

In a plurality decision,
the Supreme Court of the United States in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct.
2097 (1995), held that the federal government may utilize
racial classifications to eliminate vestiges of racial discrimination if such classifications
further a compelling governmental interest and are narrowly tailored to meet that interest.
Additionally, the Court held that
strict scrutiny is the appropriate
standard of judicial review for
all racial classifications, whether instituted by federal, state or
local government. In so holding, the Court overruled the use
ofintermediate scrutiny for federal racial classifications as permitted by Metro Broadcasting,
Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547
(1990).
In 1989, the Central
Federal Lands Highway Division ("CFLHD") awarded the
prime contract for a highway
construction project to Mountain Gravel and Construction
Company ("Mountain").
Adarand Constructors, Inc.
("Adarand") and Gonzales
Construction
Company
("Gonzales") submitted bids for
the guardrail installation portion ofthe prime contract. The
CFLHD contract contained an
incentive clause under which
Mountain received additional
compensation if it hired subcontractors who were certified
as small disadvantaged businesses under Section 8( a) ofthe
Small Business Act. Gonzales
was certified under the Section
8(a) provisions, while Adarand

did not qualify. Consequently,
despite Adarand' s lower bid,
Mountain awarded the guardrail contract to Gonzales to gain
the additional compensation
yielded by the disadvantaged
subcontractor incentive clause.
Subsequently, Adarand
sued several federal transportation officials in the United States
District Court for the District of
Colorado, alleging that the
prime contract's race-based incentive clause violated its right
to equal protection. The district
court granted the government's
motion for summary judgment.
The Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit, applying the intermediate scrutiny standard in
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
FCC, affirmed the district court.
The Supreme Court ofthe United States granted certiorari to
determine whether the intermediate scrutiny standard or the
strict scrutiny standard should
be used during judicial review
of federal programs in which
race-based preferences are used
to further a compelling governmental interest.
In beginning its analysis, the Court first ascertained
whether Adarand had standing
to request forward-looking injunctive and declaratory relief,
as Adarand was required to allege that future use of subcontractor clauses would be '" an
invasion of a legally protected
interest which is (a) concrete
and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. ,,,
Adarand Constructors, 115 S.
Ct. at 2104 (quoting Lujan v.
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Defenders ofWildlife, 504 US.
555, 560 (1992)). The Court
found that Adarand made an
adequate showing that it would
likely compete for future
CFLHD construction contracts
against companies certified as
small disadvantaged businesses, and therefore, had standing
to request relief. Id. at 2105.
Next, the Court noted
that the Fifth Amendment,
which gave rise to Adarand's
claim, provided a less explicit
guarantee of equal protection
than the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 2105-06. The
Court acknowledged, however, that equal protection obligations imposed by the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments have
become "indistinguishable." Id.
at 2107.
Combining precedent,
equal protection analysis, and
its holding from City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469 (l989)(Fourteenth
Amendment requires strict scrutiny for all race-based state governmental actions), the Court
established three general propositions for analyzing governmental racial classifications: 1)
skepticism; 2) consistency; and
3) congruence. Id. at211 1. The
Court believed that skepticism
must be an inherent part of any
judicial review, as any"'preference based on racial or ethnic
criteria must necessarily receive
a most searching examination. '"
Id. (quoting Wygantv. Jackson
BoardofEd, 476US.267, 273
(1986)). The consistency proposition strengthened the Court's
view that the "'standard ofre-
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view under the Equal Protection Clause is not dependent on
the race of those burdened or
benefited by a particular classification. '" Id. (quoting Croson,
488 US. at 494). The congruence proposition supported the
Court's finding that equal protection analysis was identical
under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Id. (citing
Buckleyv. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,93
(1976)). Those three propositions, reasoned the Court, allowed any person subjected to
unequal treatment because of
racial classifications to require
a governmental actor to justify
those racial classifications under the purview of strict judicial scrutiny. Id.
Although the three
propositions derive from the
concept that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments protect individuals and not groups, the
Court held that all governmental action based on race should
be subjected to searching judicial inquiry to "ensure that the
personal right to equal protection of the laws has not been
infringed." Id. at 2112-13. In
so holding, the Court determined that race-based preferences survive only when narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest
and analyzed by a reviewing
court under strict scrutiny, thus
overruling the intermediate
scrutiny standard allowed by
Metro Broadcasting. Id. at
2113.
The Court believed that
requiring strict scrutiny would
ensure that all courts would sub-

ject racial classifications to a
detailed examination, as utilization ofa lesser standard would
increase the risk of failure in
detecting an illegitimate racial
classification. Id. at 2117. In
dismissing the belief that strict
scrutiny is '" strict in theory, but
fatal in fact,'" the Court held
that race-based governmental
action is within constitutional
constraints ifit satisfies the narrow tailoring requirement of
prior cases. I d. (quoting
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S.
448, 519 (1980)).
In concluding that strict
scrutiny was the proper standard of review, the Court remanded Adarand Constructors
to the lower courts for further
analysis. Unsolved questions
remained concerning whether
the subcontractor incentive
clause served a compelling interest, and whether the clause
was narrowly tailored to meet
that interest. Id. at 2118. Furthermore, the Court found that
the regulatory implementation
for determining subcontractor
eligibility was unclear and
raised unresolved conflicts. Id.
In concurring opinions,
Justices Scalia and Thomas both
articulated the view that government cannot have an interest
in racial discrimination whatever the compelling interest. Id.
at 2118-19. Justice Thomas
further stated that "governmentsponsored racial discrimination
... is just as noxious as discrimination inspired by malicious
prejudice." Id. at 2119.
In a dissent which attacked the maj ority' s three-
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pronged standard, Justice
Stevens held that the consistency proposition would require
strict scrutiny of race-based affirmative action, but not ofgender-based affirmative action. Id.
at 2122. Justice Stevens also
rejected the congruence proposition, stating that the majority
ignored a purposeful incongruence between the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments that empowered Congress to be the primary defender ofminorities. I d.
at 2126.
The Supreme Court of
the United States in Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena held
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that the federal government,
when attempting to further a
compelling governmental interest through the use of racial
classifications, was subject to
the same strict scrutiny standard as state governments.
Under Adarand Constructors,
if racial preferences are used to
foster the inclusion of minorities, their use is limited to situations were prior discrimination was overt and resistant to
change. Given the integration
of racial classifications into
contemporary society, minorities of all walks of life will
surely feel the impact of
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Adarand Constructors, as the
government, whether prodded
by judicial intervention or on
their own initiative, reviews
current policies and revises
them accordingly. Though discrimination of any sort is odious, gains made by minorities
through utilization ofracial preferences cannot be discounted
and hopefully Adarand Constructors has not dealt a telling
blow to continued advancement.
-Paul J. Wilson
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The Eight Congressional Election Districts of Maryland
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